讲座题目：A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Responsibility Conduct in Two-echelon Supply Chains
主讲嘉宾： 李武
时 间： 2014年6月19日（星期四）下午13：30—15：30
地 点：江南大学文浩科学馆107学术报告厅
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江南大学商学院
2014年6月18日
主讲嘉宾简介
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李武，博士，加拿大温莎大学商学院管理科学教授。1991年从厦门大学计算机与系统科学系毕业，获学士学位；1994年在厦门大学系统科学系获系统工程专业硕士学位；2003年在加拿大滑铁卢大学系统设计工程系获工学博士学位。2003-04年在加拿大滑铁卢大学系统设计工程系从事博士后研究工作；2004年9月至今在温莎大学商学院任教，并于2011年6月-12月由日本学术振兴会外籍聘用研究员项目资助在东京工业大学价值与决策科学系进行访问研究。主要研究方向包括决策理论与方法、供应链管理以及冲突分析等。李武博士的研究获得两项加拿大自然科学与工程研究基金会发现基金项目的支持（2006-2011；2012-2017），同时也多次得到国家教育部春晖计划短期项目支持（2007， 2009，2011,2013）。自2001年以来，在Computers and Operations Research , European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of the Operational Research Society及Water Resources Research等国际权威期刊发表31篇学术论文。李武博士的研究工作得到国内外同行的广泛引用(SCI/SSCI累计引用330余次)，在相关领域产生了较大的影响。
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讲座主要内容
This research presentation investigates how two supply chain members, a downstream firm (F) and an upstream supplier (S), interact with each other with respect to corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviour and what impact exogenous parameters may have on this interaction. A game-theoretic analysis is conducted to obtain equilibriums for both simultaneous-move and sequential-move CSR games. Under certain assumptions, it is concluded that (1) there exists a mutual incentivebetween their CSR behaviour, whereby a win-win performance in terms of both CSR and profitability is achieved as long as exogenous parameters exceed certain critical thresholds; (2) A higher consumer marginal social-benefit potential (MSBP) or a lower consumer marginal perception difficulty(MPD)helps to lower the critical thresholds of CSR budgets and CSR operational efficiency by S and F, makingit easier to achieve the win-win performance; (3) An increase in one supply chain member’s CSR budgetor CSR operational efficiency tends to make the supply chaineasier to attain a win-win performance scenario; (4) if CSR decisions are made sequentially, a prior commitment to CSR activities from one supply chain member strengthens the mutual incentive and facilitates the realization of the win-win performance. Business implications of these research findings are also discussed.
