讲座题目：Competition between Manufacturers and Sharing Economy Platforms: An Owner Base and Sharing Utility Perspective
主讲嘉宾：李 武 (Kevin W. Li)
Dr. Kevin W. Li is Professor of Management Science in the Odette School of Business at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Dr. Li obtained his B.Sc. in Control Sciences and M.A.Sc. in Systems Engineering from Xiamen University, China, and Ph.D. in Systems Design Engineering from the University of Waterloo, Canada in 1991, 1994, and 2003, respectively. Dr. Li was awarded two Invitation Fellowships by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) and held them in the Department of Value and Decision Sciences at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, June–December 2011 and May–July 2015, respectively. Dr. Li’s research spans from logistics and supply chain management to conflict resolution and decision modelling. His research has been supported by three individual Discovery Grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). He was awarded the short-term Chunhui Visiting Fellowship sponsored by the Ministry of Education of China five times. Dr. Li has coauthored 64 articles in international refereed journals such as European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, Transportation Research, Part E, and Water Resources Research. Among these publications, 62 papers have been indexed in SCI/SSCI. These publications have been cited for 2353 times with an h-index of 29 as per the Web of Science and five of his articles have been/were identified as Highly Cited Papers by ESI. Dr. Li serves as an Associate Editor of Group Decision and Negotiation and on the Editorial Boards of several other refereed journals.
We develop a two-period, five-stage game model with sharing utility to analyze how a manufacturer competes with a sharing economy platform that facilitates sharing of the manufacturer's product from both a long-run and a short-run perspective. We use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to reveal how the manufacturer chooses its long-run (period-1) price to foster an owner base (a collection of the period-1 product buyers) that in turn affects its short-run (period-2) competition with the sharing economy platform (hereafter, platform for short). Analytical results show that (1) in the short run, an increase in the owner base has a negative (non-monotonic) impact on the profitability of the manufacturer (platform) while an increase in sharing utility negatively (positively) affects the profitability of the manufacturer (platform); (2) in the long run, the existence of the platform could be irrelevant for, pose a threat to, or benefit the manufacturer contingent upon different levels of sharing utility; (3) in the long run, a win-win scenario is attainable for both the manufacturer and platform when sharing utility is high enough. The managerial implication of this research is that the manufacturer and platform should collaborate to improve sharing utility to a sufficiently high level by enhancing the sense of community belonging, fostering benefits from sharing activities, and addressing sustainability concerns, thereby achieving a win-win result.