讲座题目：How Add-on Pricing Interacts with Distribution Contracts

主讲嘉宾：谭寅亮

讲座时间：2023年5月9日（星期二）下午14：00—16：00

讲座地点：商学院116东方厅

欢迎感兴趣的师生前来聆听！

江南大学商学院

2023年5月6日

主讲嘉宾简介

谭寅亮博士、美国休斯顿大学鲍尔商学院决策和信息科学终身教授、鲍尔讲席教授、供应链管理方向系主任、慧与科技数据科学研究中心资深研究员。曾在美国杜兰大学弗里曼商学院管理科学方向担任助理教授，副教授，戈德林国际教育中心行政主任，并获得终身教授与讲席教授职位。谭寅亮博士毕业于美国佛罗里达大学沃灵顿商学院，学习运营管理及信息系统。他拥有丰富的商业分析方面的教学经验，获得过弗里曼商学院年度最佳教师奖。其研究兴趣主要集中在数字经济，以及科技管理与创新等领域。他在国际顶级期刊Management Science, MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Production and Operations Management， Decision Science 等发表20余篇论文，并获得过国际决策科学年会的最佳论文奖。谭博士现在担任Production and Operations Management（国际顶级期刊）的资深编辑, Decision Sciences Journal的部门编辑, 以及Information & Management的副编辑和Information Systems Research (ISR)的编委会成员。2019年被评为世界最佳40名40岁以下的商学院教授, 同年他获得了国际决策科学学会颁发的早期职业成就奖。2022年获得INFORMS 信息系统学会颁发的 Sandy Slaughter 早期职业成就奖以表彰他对信息系统领域做出的贡献。

讲座主要内容

With the rise of the Internet economy, an increasing number of firms are offering their core products through online platforms, but retail add-ons directly to consumers. Meanwhile, many online platforms have also started adopting the agency (model) contract, where the upstream firms decide the retail prices of products while the downstream platforms take a pre-determined cut from each sale. This study examines the interaction between an upstream firm’s add-on strategy and a downstream online platform’s distribution contract choice. We find that such a firm prefers bundling the add-on and the core product together under the wholesale contract, but prefers retailing the add-on separately under the agency contract. Our research thus is the first to suggest that the distribution contract can critically affect a firm’s choice between add-on pricing and bundling. On the platform side, we show that a higher commission rate does not always result in a higher profit for the platform under the agency contract. We further identify two conditions under which the platform prefers the agency contract over the wholesale contract: The commission rate for the platform cannot be too low, and the market potential of the add-on cannot be too large. For the overall channel, we show that the interaction between add-on pricing and distribution contracts leads to sub-optimal channel performance. That said, it is possible for both the firm and the platform to obtain higher profits under the agency contract than under the wholesale contract. Finally, we also demonstrate the robustness of our findings under several alternative model specifications.