讲座题目：Strategic Data Disclosure by an Intermediary with Asymmetric Payoffs  

主讲嘉宾：徐子彬

时  间：2023年5月30日（星期二）上午 9：00—11：00

地  点：商学院116东方厅

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江南大学商学院

2023年5月26日

主讲嘉宾简介

徐子彬毕业于美国南加州大学马歇尔商学院，目前任香港城市大学深圳研究院副研究员，曾任上海交通大学营销系助理教授和副教授。研究领域集中在企业决策的量化模型，包括大数据下的个性化定价策略与偏好信息匹配，消费者隐私与数据管控，互联网平台治理与信息设计等。研究成果在Marketing Science, Management Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing等顶尖期刊发表。他曾主持国家自然科学基金面上项目和青年项目，上海浦江学者基金，并参与国家自然科学基金重点项目，参与创建中国高等院校数字与市场研究专业委员会。此外，他教授《商业数据分析》，《市场博弈与精准营销》，《营销模型与工程》等多门本科生，研究生，高管培训课程，曾获上海市教学竞赛二等奖和南加大年度优秀教学奖。

讲座主要内容

Intermediaries often engage in partial information disclosure, which can take the form of either overreporting and underreporting, especially when intermediaries and sellers have asymmetric payoff allocation due to varying responsibilities. This can lead to additional channel conflict beyond the classic double marginalization problem. In this paper, we analyze the roles of partial data disclosure in the channel with asymmetric payoffs by modeling an intermediary which has private access of market information but may either overreport or underreport the market condition to a seller to affect its pricing decision. Our results suggest that partial data disclosure may be optimal only when asymmetric payoff structures are present. Contrary to conventional wisdom, imperfect communication can lead to increased channel profits relative to full disclosure by mitigating the channel conflicts. This is because strategic communication by intermediaries can induce sellers to lower their prices and thus indirectly improve channel coordination.